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I Preface
The political science that Gordon grew into in the
1960s was full-bodied: it dealt above all with con-
tentious politics as a means of societal transformation.
If the prospects for radical change from the left had
continued to look bright after the mid-1970s, he no
doubt would have hung on in there. He never
became conservative by instinct. But the world did
become a more conservative place. Gordon's atten-
tion shifted to more routinised forms of politics. His
interest in social transformation was re-focused first
on the (capitalist) developmental state and then,
more latterly, on civil society He adapted, but
refused to move down either of two roads on which
many of his contemporaries embarked. First, he had
neither political nor professional sympathy with
neo-liberalism. He would tolerate colleagues dab-
bling on the fringes of neo-liberal political economy
(e.g. public choice), but would neither encourage
nor indulge in it himself. Second, he could rarely
bring himself to respect or engage with the vapidities
that pass for theory or grand ideas in the formal pol-
icy statements of aid and development agencies. A
rapid steer in another direction, toward real politics,
awaited any student indicating an interest in writing
a term-paper on, for example, 'institution building
and aid' - or 'governance', 'empowerment', 'partic-
ipation' and any of the other jargon terms into which
development agencies continually tried to breathe
life. Cant was not a word that Gordon often used. He
preferred more earthy terms. He would approve of
our using it here to describe the insincerity,
hypocrisy and emptiness that characterises so much
aid-speak. He would be less enthusiastic about the
volte face that follows immediately: our attempt seri-
ously to address the concerns of aid agencies and to
suggest how they might think about putting their
money where their mouths are.
2 Introduction
There is a substantial disjuncture between what
international aid and development agencies say
they want to do and what they actually do. Most
have for many years accepted the principle that
effective poverty alleviation should have significant
collective and mobilising dimensions: they talk in
terms of 'empowerment', 'participation', and fram-
ing programmes that are responsive to the
demands of poor communities. In practice, they do
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respects they have regressed: in recent years, large
amounts of money have gone to new programmes
that may undermine the scope for collective action
on the part of the poor - while proclaiming such
action to be the goal (see Section 5). That is the cant
to which the title refers. Aid and development agen-
cies are probably forced into hypocrisy mainly
because of the structural contradictions they face,
notably the pressures to continue to disperse money
and to find ways of legitimating their activities that
appeal to very diverse constituencies. But genuine
inability to see through the fog of fashionable jargon
and to think clearly about the political and institu-
tional issues may be part of the problem. The pur-
pose of this article is to develop a set of concepts
and a language that help us better to understand
how 'external agencies' could contribute to the (col-
lective) empowerment of poor people through the
ways in which they design, organise, and imple-
ment anti-poverty programmes in poor countries.
This definition of the problem raises several ques-
tions about the meanings of the terms we use. For
present purposes, some of them can be left fairly
open. 'External agencies' refers essentially to gov-
ernment and to other organisations, mainly NGOs,
that are involved in development activities. 'Anti-
poverty programmes' covers any programmes that
are directed mainly or solely at poor people,
whether or not 'poverty' is formally part of their
brief. Primary education in rural areas of most poor
countries would therefore be included.
'Mobilisation', which we use as a synonym for col-
lective empowerment, connotes both action (i.e.
people being involved in doing things) and organi-
sation. Forms of mobilisation vary widely
How might 'friends of the poor' in government or
other external agencies help increase the effective-
ness of anti-poverty programmes by designing,
organising, or implementing them so as to stimulate
the mobilisation of the poor? They cannot provide,
qua bureaucrats, the full range of resources that
contribute to creating mobilising structures. In par-
ticular, they are poorly placed to provide ideologi-
cal resources: the ideas and values around which
collective action can be built. They are, however,
potentially better placed to provide certain kinds of
For a useful discussion of the types of resources
needed and used by social movements, see McAdam et
al. (1997).
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organisational resources and political opportunïties. In
principle, one can distinguish four different mecha-
nisms (or strategies) that external agencies can use
to encourage the mobilisation of the poor. Two or
more may be combined in practice, but they are
best treated separately for purposes of exposition.
2.1 Provocation
This may in reality be the most widespread mecha-
nism through which governments in particular suc-
ceed in mobilising the poor - angering them by
treating them badly in some way: failing to truck in
emergency drinking water supplies during drought;
forcibly displacing people to build highways, dams
or shopping malls; compulsorily acquiring food-
grains from producers at low prices, etc.
Provocation is potentially a powerful instrument,
but one that rarely can be wielded with finesse or
precision - and that anyway involves first hurting
the poor. lt does not merit further discussion.
2.2 Conscientisation
This is the practice of despatching 'social mobilisers'
to mobilise the poor by encouraging them to examine
their situation (usually collectively) and, hopefully to
decide collectively to do something to change it. This
technique is most commonly adopted by non-state
organisations: political parties, religious organisations,
and other NGOs of various kinds. Agencies that
employ social mobilisers to work with the poor in
relation to their own programmes - and there are
plenty of such cases in the development field, includ-
ing government agencies - are vulnerable to two
kinds of moral hazard. First, they have every incentive
to discourage mobilisation once it becomes uncom-
fortable for them, and thus to keep it closely under
control. Second, as we illustrate in Section 3 below,
the agencies and their field staff easily slip into the role
of salespersons, trying to 'sell' to their clients (the
poor) the products that the agency has available, even
if they are inappropriate. Casual evidence suggests
that conscientisation initiatives rarely result in much
authentic mobilisation. There is little scope for agen-
cies that are themselves running development pro-
grammes to employ conscientisation effectively in
relation to their own programmes. Conscientisation is
far more likely to be effective if employed by one
external agency to mobilise the poor in relation to the
activities of other agencies or parties.
2.3 Organisational preference
Government agencies, in particular, are well placed
to mobilise the poor by giving preferential treat-
ment to particular grassroots organisations that
(claim to) represent the poor. This preference can
have two main components that tend to go
together: recognition and licensing of certain cate-
gories of organisations (and not others); and chan-
nelling resources to the poor through those
organisations to encourage the poor to become
involved. These kinds of arrangements are generally
labelled 'corporatist'. But corporatism has a bad
reputation. Whose interests might be served? Are
we not just opening the door to co-optation: insti-
tutional arrangements through which the state
mobilises and organises socio-economic groups in
its own interests, and in ways that closely circum-
scribe the autonomy of the organisations and their
capacity genuinely to represent societal interests?
The ambiguities in the corporatist relationship are
captured in Philip Selznik's description of participa-
tion as 'a technique for turning an unorganized cit-
izenry into a reliable instrument for the
achievement of administrative goals'. Co-optation is
a potential threat whenever a grassroots organisa-
tion enters into any relationship with a powerful
external agency;2 this is especially true within cor-
poratist structures. But co-optation and demobilisa-
tion of the grassroots organisation is not the only
potential 'unbalanced' outcome of corporatism.
There is an equally well established tradition of
political analysis that focuses on the opposite
process: the 'capture' of state agencies by the societal
interests that they are attempting to organise. True,
the poor have limited resources through which to
effect such capture. But they do have some room to
manoeuvre. Grassroots organisations may be
exploited by external agencies, but at the same time
exploit those relationships for their own purposes.
In particular, they can enjoy leverage and bargaining
It was an acute awareness of this possibility that led
Piven and Cloward (1971), for example, to argue that
'poor people movements' could be effective only if they
totally rejected cooperation of any kind with state
agencies, and pursued the strategy of making a nuisance
of themselves.
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power if the external agencies (a) are disunited, with
elements seeking support and allies from elsewhere;
(b) focus their attention and energies elsewhere,
leaving grassroots organisations with considerable
local autonomy by default;3 or (c) are dependent in
some way on a level of performance from grassroots
organisations that can only be achieved through per-
mitting them autonomy and initiative. Even explic-
itly corporatist systems can generate organisations
that bring to the poor both resources and some
degree of, often heavily contested, organisational
autonomy For grassroots political entrepreneurs
have incentives to move into these organisations and
to try to expand their scope and autonomy.
For example, the corporatist rural workers unions
that were established in rural Brazil by military
regimes in the 1960s provided both (a) 'cover'
behind which local politicians, trades unionists and
social activists could operate and (b) legitimacy for
parallel organising activities conducted by the
Catholic Church. They helped to lay the basis for
the rich network of social movements for the rural
poor that are found in present-day Brazil
(Houtzager 1998). The very existence of privileged
corporatist unions encouraged opposition trades
unionists to enter them and compete for power. In
some cases this has generated levels of union
activism and responsiveness to members well in
excess of the standard expectations of corporatist
arrangements (Pinhanez, 1997). Similarly, the cor-
poratism practised by Mexico's dominant ruling
party (the PRI) has provided the means for the
development of partly autonomous local move-
ments of the poor by opening up competition for
control of public resources at local level. For exam-
ple, locally-organised Food Councils were given
control of food stores, supplies of subsidised basic
foods and means of transport. Not all Food
Councils were dominated by the local elites or by
the local representatives of the PR1. There was con-
tinual struggle, which partly reflected divisions
within the FRI itself. Jonathan Fox views the strug-
gles around these programmes as an important part
of the story of the gradual widening of the scope for
The general argument that the inferior party in an
unequal relationship may be able to benefit from the
limited attention paid to the relationship by the superior
party is presented in Hirschman (1981).
autonomous associational activity in Mexico (Fox
1994).
Depending very much on the political context, cor-
poratist arrangements for giving organisational pref-
erence can encourage the poor to organise on their
own behalf. We should not dismiss them as irrelevant
to our concerns. They are, however, less than ideal.
There are three significant characteristic problems:
Any degree of local organisational autonomy that
is achieved is constantly under threat, and has
continually to be reasserted.
Insofar as the organisations receive and redistrib-
ute public money, they may become a major
charge on the government budget, with much of
the benefit going to the non-poor (e.g. the
Mexican case above).
Granting permanent organisational preference
may result in local organisational monopoly, and
then in lack of accountability and misuse of
resources and power. This was often the case, for
example, with the cororatist rural workers'
unions in Brazil, with their guaranteed income
from the state and monopoly control over pension
funds (Houtzager, 1998).
Corporatist sponsorship of poor people's organisa-
tions is potentially a useful means through which
friends of the poor' within state agencies can help
empower the poor. But there are further options.
2.4 Creating an enabling institutional
environment
The conscientisation and organisational preference
strategies are activist: they involve external agencies
and agencies directly doing things on behalf of the
poor - and that activism itself leads to moral haz-
ard. The main argument of this article is that there
are considerable opportunities to stimulate the
effective, autonomous organisation of the poor by
adopting what Gordon White would have called a
more parametric strategy: establishing and main-
taining a framework that would encourage poor
people themselves to take a more active role. This is
now orthodoxy in the context of government policy
i:oward the private sector: do less directly, and cori-
oentrate more on creating an enabling environment.
We suggest that the same argument applies to pub-
lic action and the political organisation of the poor.
The environment in which poor people and external
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organisations interact is frequently inimical to col-
lective action by the poor. It is characterised by so
much uncertainty, arbitrariness and inequality that
investment in collective action is not worthwhile.
External agencies should focus more on creating
incentives to collective action, above all by remov-
ing the obstacles that they themselves create. Four
dimensions of the performance' of external agen-
cies are of special interest to us:
Tolerance We take it as given that collective action
on the part of the poor is more likely where the
political environment is not hostile and punitive.
The fact that no more is said on this reflects our
belief that the point is obvious, not that it is unim-
portant.
Credibility This is essentially a behavioural con-
cept: the extent to which, in their relations with
the poor, public officials can be relied on to
behave like good partners, i.e. to do their job cor-
rectly and to be reliable.
Predictability This refers to the form of external
programmes: the extent to which they are stable
over time in content, form, and procedural
requirements.
Rights The extent to which (a) the benefits received
under external programmes are recognised as
moral or, better, legal entitlements and (b) there are
recognised (preferably legal) mechanisms that the
beneficiaries can access to ensure that these entitle-
ments are actually realised.
This looks like a wish list. The key point, illustrated
by the case studies in the next two sections, is that
it is not a list of preconditions for the creation of an
enabling institutional environment. A relationship can
be highly enabling in one or two of these dimen-
sions even when the general environment appears
quite bleak. External agencies do not have to per-
form well on every dimension in order to generate
positive results. Context is all. The relationship
between poor people and external agents may be
enabling, in the sense in which we have defined it,
both when it appears concordant, i.e. cooperative
and harmonious, and when it is discordant.
3 Water in Nepal: Credibility and
Concordant Collective Action
The first case is a ruraldrinking water supply pro-
gramme in Nepal that was funded by the Finnish aid
agency, FINNIDA, and implemented by a Finnish
consultancy company with expatriate and local
staff.4 The programme design was relatively ortho-
dox. Most costs were met by FINNIDA.
Communities that chose to participate were required
to organise themselves to make inputs into plan-
ning, construction, fee collection and maintenance.
Although they contributed only a fraction of con-
struction costs, their total commitments, in terms of
cash, labour and self-organisation, were significant
to them. Nepali government agencies undertook the
investigation and design work and much of the con-
struction, under the eye of the aid project staff. The
programme had been in operation for six years -
long enough for us to judge it a success in terms of
both process and outcome. A large number of water
supply schemes had been built, without glaring
design or construction failures. As far as we could
judge, villagers had made a substantial input in most
cases and exhibited a degree of ownership.
We asked villagers why and how they became
involved in this programme. The lessons we learned
are encapsulated in two responses:
Village A: 'We had wanted water for a long time. We
heard that the Fanta Company had done a good job
in Villages V and W, so we talked to them about their
experience and then approached the company.'5
Village B: 'Where we asked why it had taken the vil-
lagers three years from the time the water project
was first mooted until they began to make serious
progress to get themselves organised and raise
resources: "We have had at least four different survey
teams here from the Local Government Department
over the past fifteen years, promising us water. They
come when there is an election. We don't really trust
people who come and talk about bringing us water.
It took us a long time to learn to trust these Fanta
people. We discovered that they had done good
work elsewhere and seemed reliable.'
The reliability of which the villagers talked is what
we have termed credibility. It refers to both techni-
cal competence and dependability when interacting
with others. The perceived credibility of the exter-
nal agent is central to the willingness of communi-
ties to mobilise their own contributions. These
We undertook some research on this programme in
1996. See Moore et a?. (1996).
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conversations heightened our awareness that much
of the interaction between poor people and external
agencies is shaped by rational lack of trust on the
part of poor people. Increasingly, they are bom-
barded by visitors from outside who ask for some-
thing from them (even if only their time in
meetings) and often promise or imply some reward
for cooperation. It is difficult for villagers to get any
accurate sense of what the agenda of these outsiders
actually is, or to get any kind of binding commit-
ment in return for cooperating with them. External
agencies that have established a reputation for reli-
ability on the basis of their performance are at least
seriotis candidates for trust.
People who know the rural water sector in Nepal
might be tempted to read this case as an illustration
of the badness of the government sector and the
virtues of N GOs. For, while formally in the public
sector, the 'Fanta Company' in practice enjoyed the
operational and budgetary autonomy of an NGO.
There is, however, a clear and important contrast
between the strategies employed by the 'Fanta
Company' on the one hand, and most NGOs on the
other, to tackle the problem of villagers' rational sus-
picion of outsiders. The staff of Nepali NGOs work-
ing in the sector presented an image of their relative
strengths that could have been obtained in almost
any developing country Government agencies were
inefficient and corrupt, and only delivered standard
designs, completely disregarding the specific needs,
preferences and capacities of different groups of
clients. By contrast, we were told, NGOs could find
out what people wanted, work with local communi-
ties, ensure that appropriate low-cost designs were
used, and generally get a good job done cheaply The
government water agencies were equally critical of
the NGOs, claiming that the NGOs were working
with shoddy designs that of course could be con-
structed cheaply and quickly, but soon fell apart;
and that government agencies were left with an
almighty mess when asked to maintain and rehabil-
itate the water facilities that NGOs had constructed
in ones and two all over the country.
It was no surprise to us that spokesmen of govern-
ment agencies made little reference to what we
In many places, the term FINNIDA had been
transmuted into 'Fanta Company'. Fanta is a popular
soft-drink in South Asia.
have termed credibility issues. Such concerns rarely
feature in the public discourse of government offi-
cials in South Asia. That the NGOs were aware of
these issues is implicit in the procedure they typi-
cally adopted: sending social mobilisers into vil-
lages for weeks or months to gain the trust and
cooperation of the population before initiating
construction work. This is a variant of the conscien-
tisation strategy mentioned in Section 2. One might
usefully term it an 'active marketing' strategy, for it
involves taking the initiative to persuade villagers
to cooperate through establishing new and positive
social relations with them. Note that there was a
clear affinity between this 'active marketing' strat-
egy and the fact that many NGOs were working on
a very small scale, often spreading their resources
widely over more than one locality - a village here
and a village there. This wide scattering of activities
provides little scope for building up local reputa-
tions for credibility The more sceptical view is that
it protected NGOs against performance scrutiny
and helped maintain their dominance in their rela-
tionships with the communities where they were
working.
But was this the best solution to the distrust prob-
lem? The 'passive marketing' strategy employed by
the 'Fanta Company' - i.e. set some good examples
of reliability and then rely on reputation to interest
other villagers and elicit requests for assistance -
appears superior. It assumes a high and often justi-
fied faith in the capacity of communities to organise
themselves once they are confident that they have
reliable external partners. This obviates the need for
external social mobilisers and provides a more valid
test of community engagement and sense of owner-
ship than do commitments made in response to
'active marketing' strategies employed by influential
outsiders.
The water projects we have discussed here work
better if local people engage in collective action and
invest substantial resources in collaboration with
external agencies to ensure that collaboration takes
olace on equal terms. If they are to make substan-
ial investments in planning and construction, corn-
rnunities need a concordant relationship - both
generalised trust and extensive cooperation in
:mplementation. The credibility of the external
agency, and the reputation it thereby acquired, were
central to project success. Programme predictability
55
was a secondary factor, of some significance.
Communities needed some assurance that their
external partner would be around long enough to
ensure completion of individual projects. Although
the programme that we studied was aid-funded and
very likely to come to an end within a few years, it
had been operating for six years and worked
through the permanent Nepali government agen-
cies. Rights played no significant role. There was no
legal recourse for villagers if things went wrong and
very little political recourse: the programme was
relatively insulated from Nepali politics, and project
mistakes and failures are easily concealed from
external evaluators.
4 Public Works in India:
Programme Predictability, Rights
and Discordant Collective Action
Our second example deals with a different type of
anti-poverty intervention, and a relationship
between the poor and external agencies that has fre-
quently been discordant. The core of the story is the
way in which programme stability and, more espe-
cially, an ingenious set of rights mechanisms, have
provided significant opportunities and incentives
for local politicians and social activists to interme-
diate between organised groups of poor people and
the public bureaucracy
In the mid-1970s, the Indian state of Maharashtra
introduced an Employment Guarantee Scheme
(EGS) for its rural population - assured unskilled
manual employment on local public works on
request. When the scheme was formalised in the
mid-1970s, all rural adults over the age of eighteen
were offered a guarantee of employment within fif-
teen days of the demand being made, provided that
(a) jobseekers registered with the local administra-
tion, and (b) there were at least 50 jobseekers in one
locality In principle, although almost never in prac-
tice, government was obliged to pay an unemploy-
ment benefit if it were unable to provide suitable
work for registered jobseekers. Over the 23 years
from 1975-76 to 1998-99, the scheme has pro-
vided an annual average of 132 million work days,
on 341,661 separate work sites. Despite many
problems, EGS continues to provide relatively cost
effective and reliable income support for significant
sections of the rural poor of Maharashtra. We have
recently conducted field and documentary research
on EGS, focusing on the 'guarantee' and the role of
client mobilisation in making the scheme work.6
The conclusions are encouraging.
What makes EGS distinctive is the fact that it is
enshrined in law. The implementation details can be
changed by the executive authority of the state gov-
ernment, but the Maharashtra Employment
Guarantee Act of 1977 obliges the state government
to operate the scheme. Equally important, there is a
dedicated financing mechanism devoted only to
EGS. This consists of five specific taxes, of which
the most important is the 'professional tax' that is
borne mainly by registered professionals and formal
sector employees in the urban sector. The state gov-
ernment is obliged to make a contribution to the
Employment Guarantee Fund that matches the
yield from these dedicated taxes.
How did such progressive ideas get onto the statute
books? One part of the story is the pioneering role
played by a group of progressive politicians and
social activists. A more structural factor was the
major drought that affected large areas of Western
Maharashtra in 1970-74. The massive public works
programme mounted to deal with the consequences
of drought provided the basis on which EGS
became a state-wide programme. The state govern-
ment responded effectively to the drought in part
because the Communist and left political parties
and trades unions rooted in Mumbai (Bombay), the
state capital, had established bases in the drought
areas. They organised 'agitations' and sparked a fear
of more general unrest.
The more important question for us is why EGS has
continued to be implemented relatively effectively
in a country where there often appear to be several
public programmes for every conceivable develop-
ment problem, many of them quickly mired in
clientelist politics and/or corruption? The major
reason is that EGS jobseekers, via political representa-
tives of various hinds, have continuously been mobilised
to demand their rights. That mobilisation is far from
predictable. For this is in no sense a variant of a
standard story about public sector trades unions.
Few EGS workers belong to a union. The scheme is
far from the labour organiser dream. The work
There is a large literature on EGS, most of it published
in India. The more internationally accessible sources are
Acharya (1990), Dey (1996), Echeverri-Gent (1993),
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force is casual and fluctuating, and work sites dis-
persed and temporary. There is no basis for solidar-
ity around a common, long-term employment
relation or permanent work place. There is no scope
to use the strike weapon: if eligible jobseekers
strike, government simply saves money Because
implementation is shared locally between several
government agencies, it is difficult to find one clear
target against which to mobilise. Yet there is a great
deal of mobilisation. There have been more has
(marches) dharnas (sit-ins) and gheraos (sieges of
government offices) at many levels. The
Government of Maharashtra has several tïmes been
taken to court by trades unions and social activists
over EGS issues. This level of mobilisation, and the
consequent relative success of EGS as a social insur-
ance scheme for the rural poor, result from the
interaction of several factors. They are listed here in
ascending order of importance:
Incentives to collective action are built into the
scheme: a minimum number of people need to be
in search of employment before work sites can be
opened.
The funding mechanism for EGS is near-auto-
matic and funds have not generally been scarce at the
aggregate level. Consequently, there have been limited
incentives for politicians to undermine the scheme by
concentrating allocations on their own supporters.
While there are recurrent problems with the
execution of the scheme, the public agencies
involved enjoy a degree of credibility. One reason is
that there is a balance of power between two dis-
tinct sections of the state apparatus: the 'line depart-
ments' that directly manage EGS projects
(Irrigation, Agriculture, Forestry, Highways); and
the Revenue Department that controls the finances
and constitutes the channel through which
demands for work are expressed and, more gener-
ally, political concerns and pressures are treated.
Neither part of the state apparatus can abuse EGS
too far without risking complaints and exposure
from the other. In response to past revelations of
corruption, the mechanisms for checking and
approving EGS expenditures have become relatively
demanding and transparent.
Gaiha (1996 and 1997), and Herring and Edwards
(1983). For more details on the arguments put forward
in this article, see Joshi (1998).
(iv) EGS is characterised by a high degree of pro-
gramme predictability, in three important respects.
The first is longevity: the scheme has been in place in
much the same form for twenty years, is well institu-
tionalised, and operates throughout the state. The sec-
ond is security: because EGS is legislated, it is
worthwhile for politicians and social activists to invest
in developing their knowledge of the scheme because
they have a high degree of confidence in its continu-
ation. The third dimension of predictability is continu-
ity EGS work is always in process, with projects
always being prepared and implemented. This per-
manency contrasts with the more typical scheme,
where large-scale public employment is offered on an
ad hoc basis whenever drought strikes. Without pro-
gramme continuity, public servants have to re-learn
how to do the job each time, and politicians and
social activists representing the poor also have to re-
learn the rules. From the perspective of providing
incentives to activists to invest in pro-poor mobilisa-
tion, the permanency and continuity of EGS provide
a functional substitute for the absence of strong work-
force solidarity around the work-place (see above). It
is the character of the public programme, rather than
workforce and workplace conditions, that makes fea-
sible the mobilisation of EGS jobseekers.
(y) Above all, the legal rights enshrined in EGS cre-
ate incentives for jobseekers and their (potential)
political representatives to engage in political
mobilisation of various kinds at both local and state
levels. Action at these two levels is mutually rein-
forcing. EGS legislation in principle guarantees a
range of rights in addition to the core entitlement to
employment under the conditions set out above.
These rights include: payment if workers use their
own tools; plastic spectacles for people employed in
stone-breaking; provision of on-site drinking water,
first-aid and child-care; compensation payments
('unemployment pay') in the case of failure of gov-
ernment to provide work; and, for work sites more
than eight kilometres from employees homes,
camping facilities and access to fair-price shops.
Except for drinking-water provision, few of these
additional formal entitlements have been realised
regularly They have however provided the focus for
mobilisation, along with grievances typically found
on all public works sites, and have led to a wide
range of local level political activities, including fil-
ing cases against the state government in district
courts. Some of these issues have also been taken
up by organisations campaigning at state level.
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The EGS is far from perfect. It is unlikely to be
directly replicable elsewhere. But it provides a great
deal of inspiration, and illustrates clearly how clever
political and institutional design can encourage the
mobilisation of the poor around public programmes
in a non-corporatist fashion, while helping to make




How relevant are our concerns about enabling insti-
tutional environments to the shape of contemporary
anti-poverty interventions in poor countries?
Although contemporary anti-poverty policies tend
formally to be justified in terms like 'participation'
and responsiveness to client needs, there appears in
practice to be little concern for the issues and rela-
tionships we have discussed here. There is a prob-
lem of disabling institutional environments. Two
widespread development policy trends which we
will briefly mention give grounds for concern.
First, there has been a significant expansion in the
use of NGOs as agents for the delivery of public
services to the poor. Some rural activists blamed
the slackening of political activity around the EGS,
and related issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s
on the growth of (foreign-funded) NGOs. These
NGOs are said to be attractive employers, and to
have 'seduced' the rural activists who had previ-
ously helped mobilise the poor around issues of a
broadly 'class' nature (Joshi 1998). Whatever the
truth of that charge, it is clear that the development
activities of NGOs do not elicit the same kind of
countervailing popular organisation that the EGS
has generated. This is especially true of NGOs that
(a) are not strongly rooted in the populations they
serve; (b) are oriented mainly to obtaining external
financial resources; and (c) are engaged more in
service delivery than advocacy These types of
NGOs in particular provide pure 'benefits', not
rights in either the moral or legal sense of the term.
Equally important, NGO activities are invariably
small-scale and dispersed, and frequently experi-
mental, temporary and unstable. To the NGO
staffers and their funders, flexibility and experi-
mentation are positive values that constitute 'learn-
ing experiences'. To potential social activists these
same values are disabling, for the central role of
NGOs undermines the scope for mobilisation of
the poor around programme implementation. The
wider use of NGOs for service delivery is sometimes
defended or justified on the grounds that NGOs are
better able to mobilise the poor. Some element of
mobilisation is often built into the programmes they
implement. To that degree, there is a potential
counter-argument to the one we have advanced. We
are however sceptical of the capacity or willingness of
any but the most exceptional organisations to encour-
age or even tolerate the autonomous and potentially
antagonistic mobilisation of their own client groups.
Second, and despite the rhetorical and substantive
shift to the NGO sector, over the past decade there
has been a massive expansion of one particular type
of public anti-poverty programme: the so-called
Social Funds'.7 Originally justified mainly in terms
of coping with the social costs of economic adjust-
ment, they have become a dominant anti-poverty
instrument of the international financial institutions
and banks. A core component of Social Funds, both
substantively and ideologically, is the idea of
response to 'community demand'. Much Social
Fund expenditure is committed by asking poor, ter-
ritorially-defined 'communities' to decide how they
would like to spend an external cash injection for
community purposes. Social Funds are often man-
aged by a special bureaucratic agency, with private
firms and NGOs frequently contracted to undertake
preparation, design and construction work. The
rhetoric is of decentralisation, moving away from the
monolithic state and its 'old-fashioned', unrespon-
sive specialist departments; tapping the strengths of
the private sector and NGOs; and shifting from 'sup-
ply-driven' to 'demand-driven' service delivery
From our particular perspective on anti-poverty pro-
grammes then, Social Funds may be expected to
encourage the mobilisation of beneficiaries.
This section is based heavily on Judith Tendlerl recent
thorough review of the Social Funds (Tendler 1999).
More corroborating analyses from the agencies financing
Social Funds, see for example, Inter-American
Development Bank, (1998) and Cornia (1999).
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The reality is not only more complex but substan-
tially different. To a large degree, the real choices are
made somewhere up the line: by politicians, by
bureaucrats, or by the private companies and NGOs
who are formally supposed to elicit community
desires. There are a number of interacting reasons
for this situation. But the dominant factor is that
Social Funds programmes are neither designed nor
implemented to produce what we have labelled an
enabling institutional environment for the mobilisa-
tion of the poor. While characterised by tolerance,
they are deficient in respect of credibility, pro-
gramme predictability and rights.
The Social Funds' case is very similar to that of
NGOs: a new set of institutional arrangements for
delivering public services to the poor are justified
through the rhetoric of 'community', 'client demand',
'localism' and 'decentralisation', while little real atten-
tion is paid to creating an organisational context that
will enable the poor actually to organise to help
ensure that programmes work in their favour.
6 Concluding Comment
Gordon White would not have been shocked by this
story of Social Funds. The mean-spiritedness of pub-
lic life over the past two decades has made most of us
a little cynical. But Gordon tragically died just before
the intellectual anchor of this mean-spiritedness, the
doctrine of neo-liberalism, began clearly to lose its
holding power.8 What chance that we will we be able
to say in ten years time, that he died just before
international aid and development agencies began to
take seriously their own rhetoric about empowering
the poor, and that they approached this as a substan-
tial problem of political and institutional design,
rather than a matter for feel-good sloganeering?
See especially the damning and authoritative critiques
of the appropriateness of neo-liberal economic policy for
developing countries by Stiglitz (1998) and Rodrik
(1999).
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